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TYING
THE USE OF TYING REQUIREMENTS IN
PATENT LICENSING
BY RAMON A. KLITZKE*
Tying is the sale or license of an item (the tying item) upon the condition
that another item (the tied item) be purchased. When the tying item pos-
sesses sufficient economic power, "to appreciably restrain free competition
in the market for the tied product,"I the antitrust laws are violated. The
requisite power is presumed when the tying product is patented or copy-
righted.2 To tie a product or service to a patent therefore violates the anti-
trust laws.
The major patent tying cases will be examined in this article. The features of
tying arrangements that are either violations of the antitrust statutes or pat-
ent misuse will be sketched. General rules relating to obvious tying arrange-
ments will be discussed, as well as the principles to be applied to less obvious
tying arrangements. Some basic economic policy considerations will be sug-
gested and an attempt will be made to trace the contemporary development
of patent tying cases.
I. The Use of the Patent in Enforcing Tying Restraints
A. The Basic Business Transactions Involving Tying
Tying a secondary product to a patented product in an arms-length sale re-
quires a demand for the patented product of sufficient strength to attract
buyers to the combination. The combined sale allows the seller to avoid di-
rect competition in the market for the tied item.
Tying can also be used in patent licenses. The temptation to tie products or
services to the licensing of a patent may be irresistable if the demand for the
license is extraordinary. Patent licenses are taken by businessmen who have
pecuniary interests in making, using or selling the patented invention. It is
easier to convince a licensee to accept tied products or services than it is to
convince a mere buyer, who acquires only the right to use the patented
Copyright, 1982, Ramon A. Klitzke
* B.S., J.D., LL.M., Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School. Member of the
New York, Texas and Wisconsin Bars. Admitted to practice, U.S. Patent Office.
1. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 6 (1958).
2. International Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947); U.S. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334
U.S. 131 (1948).
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invention. Tying may appear justifiable to the licensor as a legitimate ex-
tension of the patent monopoly. However, tying services or products to pat-
ent licenses frequently violates the antitrust laws or is patent misuse.
Finally, tying may appear in leases of patented machines. Service require-
ments or raw material supplies may be tied to the leases. The lessor may use
tying to measure the intensity of use of the machine and may assume that
the extra competitive advantage to be attained under the lease is a logical
appendage to the patent monopoly. However, tying clauses in leases have
violated the antitrust laws.3
B. The Effect of Tying on Competition in the Market
Obviously, tying is unnecessary if the independent demand for the tied pro-
duct is sufficient by itself to market the quantity the seller produces. Tying
is resorted to because the seller's market power in the tied product is inade-
quate. The seller is either unwilling or is unable to compete with other sellers
of the tied product on an equal footing. By attaching the tied product to a
patented product, which may be so unique as to enjoy a relatively inelastic
demand," the seller avoids the usual competitive forces that attend normal
markets. The monopoly power of the patent is thus perverted for use in a
parallel market. Because the grant of a patent monopoly is a special privi-
lege that is an exception to the anti-monopoly laws, courts limit the effect of
the monopoly to that intended by the statutory grant and do not permit un-
due extension. 3
Each seller in a competitive market, regardless of size, controls some degree
of market power. I When market power reaches the proportions of monopo-
ly power, the possibility of antitrust violation arises, depending upon how
the monopoly power is wielded. However, the antitrust laws may apply even
if the tying product has market power that does not achieve monopoly
status and, in fact, may even fall far short of dominance.7 The monopoly
power inherent in a patented tying product is of such quality and quantity
3. International Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
4. An inelastic demand means that there will be relatively little effect on the quantity of a pro-
duct purchased when the price of that product is changed. Because there may not be a good
substitute for a patented product, and therefore little cross-elasticity of demand with products
of other competitors, a patented product may have substantial monopoly power in its relevant
market and the normal decrease in demand may not occur when price is increased.
5. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665-666 (1944).
6. Market power is the capacity to compete other than as a "perfectly competitive" firm
would. In "perfect competition," the quantity of products bought by any buyer or sold by any
seller is so small relative to the total quantity of products in the market that no one buyer or
seller can possibly affect the market price. "Perfect competition" is a fictitious condition
which is not found in the modern world.
7. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 503 (1969).
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that the tying qualifies for per se treatment 8 under Section 1 of the Sherman
Act. 9 This monopoly power binding the tying and tied products together
violates the antitrust laws because the anticompetitive restraints imposed
upon the buyer are, under the law, unreasonable. Other sellers of the tied
product are not given fair opportunity to compete.
The degree of market power in the patented product determines the success
with which the seller can sell the combination of tying and tied products. Not
all patented products reach the same heights of marketable attractiveness.
Where substitute products serve as well, the patented product does not have
the same inelasticity of demand as when the invention constitutes a major
technological advance." A given patent may possess a high degree of market
power, but a wide range of power is possible in a given market. The restraint
on competition occasioned by the tying varies directly with the market
strength of the patented product. Moreover, the very process of combining
the tied product with the patented product changes the market power of the
patented product. If the tied product is of sufficient quality to be favorably
distinguished from competitive products, it will amplify the attractiveness of
the patented tying product and serve to further increase the demand for it.
This can also occur when the seller ties a superior service to the licensing of a
patented product or machine. Conversely, the tied product may be so
undesirable that the demand for the tying product is substantially reduced.
C. Various Types of Tying Arrangements
Explicit tying arrangements are easily recognized as violative of the antitrust
laws. When the International Business Machine Corporation tied its own
punch cards to the leasing of its patented sorting machines, the Supreme
Court had little difficulty in finding that the clauses in the lease violated
Section 3 of the Clayton Act." A similar result would obtain if, instead of
leasing the machines, IBM had licensed the patents and tied the cards to the
license.
Explicit tying requirements in sales transactions are equally as destructive of
competition as they are in leases and licenses. The sale of a patented product
or machine does not allow the seller to restrict the buyer to the use of the
sellers' unpatented products or services.'I Explicit tying arrangements are
8. Per se treatment under Section 1 of the Sherman Act means that, if the arrangement is ty-
ing, it cannot be justified by any business reasons or benefits to competition. See Northern
Pacific Railway Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). "Where the sale of an unpatented product is
tied to a patented article, that is perse violation since it is a bald effort to enlarge the monopoly
of the patent beyond its terms." White Motor Co. v. U.S., 372 U.S. 253, 259 (1963).
9. International Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
10. See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1, 10 n. 8 (1947).
11. 38 Stat. 730 (1941), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §§12-27 (1980); IBM v. U.S., 298 U.S. 131
(1936).
12. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
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infrequently found because the law is clear in this regard. The anticompeti-
tive restraints resulting from such practices are no longer seriously ques-
tioned.
Some tying arrangements are more difficult to recognize and analyze. In-
genious businessmen have fashioned countless ways to hide tying arrange-
ments in apparently innocuous transactions. For example, an unpatented
product can be sold with a patented article as an inseparable package. Pat-
ented electronic equipment can be sold with detachable auxiliary attach-
ments fully attached and packaged together with the patented equipment.
The price for the package appears to be fair because of the convenience of
buying the auxiliary equipment along with the patented equipment. If, how-
ever, there is active independent competition in the sale of the auxiliary
equipment, the seller may find his package sale to be in violation of the anti-
trust laws.
The offer of "free" products or services can also disguise an illegal tying ar-
rangement. Where there is active competition in the repair or servicing of
patented machines, to tie free maintenance service to the sale or lease of the
machine may violate the antitrust laws.' 3 Similarly, it constitutes tying to
offer a "free" product with the sale of another product when the cost of the
"free" product must of necessity be included in the cost of the product
sold."
D. The Antitrust Tools Applied to Tying Arrangements
Section 3 of the Clayton Act " prohibits the sale of commodities on the con-
dition or understanding that the buyer does not use or deal in the goods of a
competitor of the seller. The statutory language expressly includes leases in
its prohibitions. The statute does not apply unless the tying results in a sub-
stantial lessening of competition or tendency to create a monopoly. To re-
quire a buyer to purchase a tied article in order to obtain the tying article
amounts to a condition that the buyer not deal in the goods of the seller's
competitor. "6 Section 3 of the Clayton Act is limited to transactions in
which both the tying and tied products are "goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies or other commodities." If either the tying or tied item
is a service, Section 3 is inapplicable." Moreover, Section 3 does not apply
13. See, for example, U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 325, 344 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
14. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
15. 15 U.S.C.A. §14 (1980).
16. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. U.S., 258 U.S. 451, 457 (1922). Selling a patented prod-
uct with the condition that the buyer (a distributor) deals only in the patentee's products,
violates Section 3 and is also patent misuse. PreformedLine Products Co. v. Fanner Mfg. Co.,
328 F. 2d 265, 140 U.S.P.Q. 500 (6th Cir. 1964).
17. U.S. v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curiam, 365
U.S. 567 (1961).
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if the tying or tied item is a patent license because a license is not a com-
modity.
Section 1 of the Sherman Act" is also used to attack tying arrangements,
whether or not Section 3 of the Clayton Act is applicable.9 Section 1 out-
laws contracts and combinations that unreasonably restrict trade.20 Tying
arrangements are unreasonable restraints of trade and, in fact, have been
held to be per se violations of Section 1.2 This means that tying arrange-
ments, like price-fixing agreements between competing sellers, have such a
"pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue," that
they are "conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm caused or the business ex-
cuse for their use. "22 The standards applied under Section 1 are similar to
those applied under Section 3 of the Clayton Act. 23 But Section 1, unlike
Section 3, applies to tying provisions in patent licenses. 24
Because Section 3 of the Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sherman Act ap-
pear to cover all illegal tying, the broad proscriptions of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act are seldom needed. Section 2 prohibits monopolization, as
well as attempts and conspiracies to monopolize . 2' Whereas Section 1 was
intended to forbid all means of monopolizing or unduly restraining trade,
Section 2 seeks to prohibit the end result desired by Section 1, even if the
business conduct leading to monopolization is not within Section 1.26 Tying
practices can be part of a course of anticompetitive conduct that violates
Section 2.2' However, Section 3 of Clayton Act and Section 1 of the Sher-
man Act are sufficiently all-inclusive to make the application of Section 2 to
tying practices unnecessary in most instances.
Anticompetitive tying can also be attacked under the broad, equitable doc-
trine of patent misuse. Other antitrust laws are unnecessary when the patent
misuse doctrine is applicable. Where a patent owner is guilty of patent mis-
use, he cannot enforce patent infringement suits. Patent misuse includes
conduct that may not violate the Sherman or Clayton Acts. In Morton Salt
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 21 the Supreme Court held that relief against
alleged infringement must be denied, "at least until it has been made to
18. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. §1 (1980).
19. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
20. Standard Oil of N.J. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
21. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. U.S., 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
22. 256 U.S. 5 (1958).
23. U.S. v. Loew's, 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
24. See, e.g., Rex Chainbelt Inc. v. Harco Products, 512 F. 2d 993, 1003; 185 U.S.P.Q. 10, 16
(9th Cir. 1975).
25. 15 U.S.C.A. §2 (1980).
26. Standard Oil of N.J. v. U.S., 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911).
27. U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
28. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
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appear that the improper practice has dissipated." I The patent misuse doc-
trine is useful in innumerable situations where the patent owner's anticom-
petitive conduct does not clearly lie within the antitrust framework.
II. Tying as a Violation of the Antitrust Laws
The antitrust laws are violated when the monopoly power of a patented ty-
ing product is used as leverage in the market of the tied product. Of course,
tying can enhance the market power of the market power of the patented ty-
ing product also, 30 even when the tied product competes with the tying pro-
duct. 3 But it is the extension of monopoly power of the patent into another
market that is of greatest moment in antitrust enforcement.
Many different products have been tied to patented products or processes in
the reported cases: motion pictures to patented projectors,32 dry ice to ice
cream transportation packages," an emulsion product to a patented pro-
cess, "4 furnace stoker elements to a patented combination,"3 salt tablets to
dispensing machines, 3 'and material supplies to shoemaking machines.3"
Not only does such tying violate the antitrust laws, but it is also patent mis-
use.3" The Supreme Court has termed tying an "unauthorized extension of
the (patent) monopoly,"" in which the patentee ignores "the limitation in-
herent in the patent grant."'"
A. The Initial Development of the Law of Tying
The genesis of patent tying law" emerged from the infant motion picture in-
dustry at the turn of the century. A patent on a new film-feeding mechanism
in "project-kinetoscopes" was the subject of an infringement suit that
reached the Supreme Court in Motion Picture Patents v. Universal Film
Mfg. Co.'" The patent owner was able to limit purchasers of the patented
projectors to exhibition of only designated films because the patented ma-
chines were the only ones that operated successfully. The Court held that
the restriction was invalid and could not be enforced against purchasers of
the machines. It was an attempt to create a monopoly in a commodity
29. 314 U.S. 493.
30. See 3 Areeda & Turner, "Antitrust Law," 259-260 (1978).
31. See Times-Picayune Publ. Co. v. U.S., 354 U.S. 594 (1953).
32. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917).
33. Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
34. Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
35. Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. Co., 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
36. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
37. United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. U.S., 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
38. Leitch Mfg. Co. v. Barber Co., 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
39. 302 U.S. at 463.
40. Id.
41. See the excellent discussion in Bowman, Patent and Antitrust Law, 163-182 (1973).
42. 243 U.S. 402 (1917).
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wholly outside of the patent. 3 The restriction was imposed through a so-
called "License Agreement" between the patent owner and the manufactur-
er of the machines, but the patentee attempted to impose the restriction on
all users of the projectors by means of a warning plate on the machines. The
Court's rule applied to restrictive sales of the machines and the case is there-
fore not a direct precedent for restrictive licensing arrangements that in-
volve no purchases of the patented article." The purchase of a patented ma-
chine carries with it an implied license to use the machine, but the proceeds
of the sale constitute the complete return to which the patent owner is en-
titled. Once the patent owner parts with the title to the machine, there can
be no further restriction on the materials to be used with the machine.
Suppose that the patent owner leases the machine instead of selling it. In
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. U.S., " the defendant leased patented shoe
machinery with several restrictions, one of which was a requirement that the
lessees purchase supplies exclusively from the defendant. In holding the re-
strictions to be violations of Section 3 of the Clayton Act, the Court con-
ceded that the patent grant gave the patentee the right to make lawful li-
censes and agreements. But the patent did "not protect the making of con-
tracts in restraint of trade, or those which tend to monopolize trade or com-
merce in violation of the Sherman Act . . . . The same principle applies to
the Clayton Act."" The lessees were offered alternative leases free of the
objectionable conditions complained of, but the alternative leases were
available only upon a substantial initial payment of cash. The restrictive
leases permitted royalty payments over the lives of the leases and were there-
fore much more attractive. The Court held that the restrictive leases would
violate the Act regardless of the availability of the alternative leases." Sec-
tion 3 of the Clayton Act applies, even where the buyer or lessee is not en-
tirely foreclosed from competing suppliers.48
The United Shoe Corp. also required lessees to perform all manufacturing
operations on United Shoe machines and to take certain additional
machinery from United Shoe. The use of these clauses was also enjoined.' 9
43. 243 U.S. at 518.
44. Moreover, the Court's reasoning is clouded by its untoward sympathy for the fledgling
movie industry:
"A restriction which would give to the plaintiff such potential power for evil over an in-
dustry which must be recognized as an important element in the amusement life of this
nation, under the conclusions we have stated in this opinion, is plainly void, because
wholly without scope and purpose of our patent laws, and becuase, if sustained, it would
be gravely injurious to that public interest, which we have seen is more a favorite of the
law than is the promotion of private fortunes." 243 U.S. at 519.
45. 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
46. 258 U.S. 463-464.
47. 258 U.S. 464.
48. Thomson Mfg. Co. v. F.T.C., 150 F. 2d 952 (1st Cir. 1945), cert. den., 326 U.S. 776 (1945)
I Signode Steel Strapping Co. v.'F.T.C., 132 F. 2d 48 (4th Cir. 1942).
49. 258 U.S. 456.
339
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While the leases did not explicity prohibit lessees from using machinery of
United Shoe's competitors, the Court held that the practical effect of the re-
strictions brought the leases within the language of Section 3 of the Clayton
Act. S0
United Shoe argued that the lease restrictions were ancillary to the patent
rights in the machinery and protected the just compensation intended under
the patent laws. But the Court emphasized that the Clayton Act specifically
applied to goods and machinery, "whether patented or unpatented." This
phrase was added to the Act, "with the express purpose of preventing rights
granted by letters patent from securing immunity from the inhibitions of the
act."" United Shoe argued that the Clayton Act was an unconstitutional
limitation on patent rights and deprived patentees of property without due
process of law. The Court countered that the Act merely made unreason-
able restraints illegal and did not limit the legitimate patent rights intended
under the Patent Act."3
In Motion Picture Patents and United Shoe, the Supreme Court laid the
foundation for further analysis of the complicated licensing and marketing
schemes that evolved following the great technological adances of the
1940's and 1950's." During that period, invention patenting was a corner-
stone of the aggressive consumer marketing and advertising structures
erected by national firms. As patent development and acquisition increased,
different ways were discovered to leverage the patent monopoly into
markets for unpatented products aad related services. The cases handed
down in the last three or four decades reflect this flurry of competitive in-
genuity and provide an intricate pattern of rules and rule exceptions. 5
B. The Principal Rules in Patent Tying Cases
1. Tying Unpatented Supplies to Patent Licenses
A patent license grants at least one of the three basic rights that the patentee
acquires under Section 271(a) of the Patent Code." The licensee may re-
ceive (1) the right to make, (2) to use or (3) to sell the patented invention
without infringing the patent grant. Licenses usually grant more than one of
these rights. License restrictions can be more easily analyzed by examining
the effects on each of the rights individually.
50. 258 U.S. 457
51. 258 U.S. 460.
52. 258 U.S. 463-464.
53. See, e.g., the excellent discussion in Berle & DeCamp, "Inventions and their
Management," 3rd ed., pp. 665-670 (International Textbook Co., Scranton, Pa. 1951).
54. Many of the major cases involving patents and tying are discussed in Nordhaus, "Patent-
Antitrust Law," 3rd ed., §§62-78 (Jural Publ. Co., Chicago, 1981).
55. 35 U.S.C. §271(a) (1976 and Supp. III 1979).
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First, licensing the right to make the patented invention is usually not
granted without an attendant right to use or sell it, unless the invention is
made for the use of the patentee only. The right to make the invention, i.e.,
the right to reproduce the article or composition of matter, is of little value
unless the printed patent specification adequately discloses the relationship
between the elements of the invention and, in some instances, the steps the
inventor took to produce those relationships (e.g., the process for pro-
ducing a chemical compound). The Patent Code requires the specification
to contain a written description in such full, clear, concise and exact terms
as to enable any person skilled in the art to which the invention pertains to
make and use it.56 Notwithstanding this explicit mandate, reproduction of
the invention often requires knowledge of additional "know-how." This
know-how is frequently licensed separately because it is comprised of trade
secrets that have independent value.
Once the licensee acquires all of the technology necessary to successfully re-
produce the invention, the next step is the acquisition of the raw materials
or necessary parts. If the licensor limits the licensee as to the source of the
supplies, an antitrust issue arises. It is the anticompetitive effect in the
market for the tied supplies that results in an antitrust violation and the vio-
lation is usually treated as per se illegal.
In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment Co., S7 the owner of a com-
bination patelit attempted to limit the installation and use of the invention
to licensees who purchased an unpatented element from the plaintiff or its
licensees. The Court held that this constituted patent misuse and the pat-
entee was precluded from enforcing an action for contributory infringe-
ment.-8
Patent licensors have attempted various means of enforcing supply require-
ments and most of these constitute patent misuse. For example, warranty
agreements containing such restrictions have been held to be misuse."
Reasons given for such restrictions vary, but a common argument is the
need for licensor control of the quality of the result intended by the in-
vention. The licenses must specify the supplies so that the licensees achieve
the result obtained by the licensor. It is feared that supplies obtained outside
of the control of the licensor will be inferior and the resulting product will
not reach the standard promised in the specification of the patent. The sim-
ple judicial response is that the licensor can maintain quality control by
56. 35 U.S.C. §112 (1976 and Supp. III 1979).
57. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
58. 320 U.S. at 668-669.
59. F.C. Russell Co. v. Comfort Equipment Corp., 194 F. 2d 592, 93 U.S.P.Q. 119, (7th Cir.
1952); F.C. Russell Co. v. Consumer Insulation Co., 119 F. Supp. 119, 107 U.S.P.Q. 131 (D.
N.J. 1954), aff'd 226 F. 2d 373 (3rd Cir. 1955); see also, Kelly v. G.M., 425 F. Supp. 13 (E.D.
Pa. 1976).
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setting minimum specifications for the supplies, and allowing the licensee to
buy them from any particular supplier.60
The second right which may be licensed is the right to use the invention. If
patented raw materials are tied to the use of the invention, it is a violation of
Section 3 of the Clayton Act and is also patent misuse. In Morton Salt v.
G.S. Suppiger,6, licensees of patented salt tablet depositing machines were
limited to tablets sold by the licensor. In an action for patent infringement,
the defense of patent misuse was upheld. It did not matter that the alleged
infringer suffered no direct harm by reason of tying.62 A similar result ob-
tains where the owner of a process patent ties unpatented materials to a li-
cense for the use of the process.6
When the patented invention is sold by the patentee, or one duly licensed by
the patentee, a license to use it is implied, regardless of any explicit under-
standing. 6' To require a buyer to purchase unpatented products or services
from the patentee is patent misuse and is also a violation of Section 3 of the
Clayton Act. A restriction requiring the buyer to take unpatented items
from the patentee cannot be enforced. 6
Finally, the right to sell the invention may be licensed, with or without the
other two patent rights. Tying unpatented products or services to the right
to sell is patent misuse6 and is a violation of Section 3 of the Clayton Act. 6
The licensor, having chosen to receive a return from allowing another to sell
the invention, can claim no ancillary right to tie unpatented items to the li-
cense. The reasons that disallow such tying are similar to those applicable to
licenses to make or use the invention.
2. Leasing Arrangements with Tying Clauses
There appears to be little difference in the applicable tying rule, whether the
tying is through a patent license or a lease of the patented invention. In fact,
the leasing arrangement should be subject to stricter scrutiny because licen-
sing restrictions are permissible as rights ancillary to the patent monopoly. 68
60. International Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392, 398 (1947).
61. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
62. 314 U.S. 494.
63. B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942). Full requirement contracts are sometimes
tied to process patent licenses and are illegal, U.S. v. Linde Air Products Co., 83 F. Supp. 978,
83 U.S.P.Q. 335 (N.D. Ill. 1949).
64. Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502, 516 (1917).
65. 243 U.S. at 518.
66. Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1947).
67. International Salt Co. v. U.S., 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
68. For example, grant-back provisions which require the licensee to convey improvement
patents back to the licensor, are not illegal. Transparent- Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith
Co., 329 U.S. 637 (1947).
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Leasing restrictions must be enforced through contract and property law
and are restraints of trade clearly outside of the protection of the patent
statutes.
The basic rule originated in United Shoe Machinery v. U.S.,' 9 which has
already been discussed. 0 In United Shoe the lessor supplied more than 95
per cent of the shoe machinery in the United States," and the case is thus
not the best precedent where the lessor does not possess such monopoly
power. However, subsequent cases have held that inordinate market control
need not be found if a patent is the source of the market power. The in-
herent market power in the patent covering the leased item is sufficient to
constitute the tying as violative of the antitrust laws.'"
Even if tying unpatented supplies to a lease does not result in a monopoly of
the tied products, the lessor will still be guilty of unlawful tying.' 3 Where
the lessor has a dominant position in the relevant market of which the
patented invention is a part, then any restrictive provisions in leasing ar-
rangements may readily result in violations of Section 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act."
A principal case involving tying provisions in leases of patented machines is
International Salt Co. v. U.S." Lessees were required to use only Inter-
national's salt products, but were allowed to buy salt on the open market if
any competitor of International offered salt of equal grade at a lower price.
The availability of an alternative supply did not prove persuasive to the
Court. It held that the leases violated both Section 1 of the Sherman Act
and Section 3 of the Clayton Act.
3. Other Types of Tying Requirements in Leases and Licenses
A restriction on maintenance service for a patented machine can be tied to ei-
ther a patent license or a lease of the invention. A common justification for
such a provision is the need for expert maintenance to ensure continued ef-
fective operation. The implication is that the know-how needed to maintain
the machine resides in the expert personnel of the patent owner, but not else-
where. Although the know-how needed to maintain the patented machine is
sometimes licensed separately, the patentee can retain this know-how as a
trade secret and then tie maintenance service to the license or the lease.
69. 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
70. See note 45, supra, and accompanying text.
71. 258 U.S. at 455.
72. See U.S. v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38, 45 (1962).
73. U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 335 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
74. U.S. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., op. cit. supra, note 73.
75. 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
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Service requirements were tied to leases of shoe machinery in U.S. v. United
Shoe Machinery Corp. ,6 Although the written leases imposed the expense of
maintenance on the lessees, and did not explicitly require maintenance ser-
vices to be obtained from the lessor, the lessor provided the services without
extra cost, charging only for the parts that were required. This caused a
shortage of large scale repair companies independent of the lessor." This
was a significant factor in the court's decision to find a violation of Section
2 of the Sherman Act. To offer a "free" service or product only to buyers
of a product that has significant market power may constitute illegal tying if
the buyers must take both items.71 There is no substantive distinction be-
tween such a transaction and the package sale or the package license that of-
fers no practical alternative to the prospective buyer.
Other types of tying requirements have been found to violate the antitrust
laws where the effect was to lessen competition in the tied product. In
United Shoe Machinery Corp. v. U.S.,7 unpatented supplies were tied to
shoe machinery leases. A number of other provisions in the leases were also
condemned by the Court, including restricting the use of the leased ma-
chinery to shoes previously processed only on the lessor's machines. The
lessor also required that any necessary additional machinery be taken from
the lessor. While such requirements are not within the language of Section 3
of the Clayton Act, which requires that the tying and tied items be goods or
commodities, the Court did not hesitate to enjoin the use of these clauses. 10
4. Tying Arrangements as Patent Misuse
Patent misuse is the extension of the leverage of the patent monopoly be-
yond the scope permitted by the Constitution and the patent statutes."1
Where the patent owner has been guilty of misuse, no infringement action
may be brought until the misuse has ceased and the consequences of the
misuse have been dissipated. ' 2 The doctrine of patent misuse encompasses
conduct that may also constitute a violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act and Section 3 of the Clayton Act, but the doctrine is not limited to
such violations." The proof of violation of the antitrust statutes necessi-
tates a showing that the accused conduct substantially lessens competition
76. Op. cit. supra, note 73.
77. 110 F. Supp. at 325.
78. Cf. F.T.C. v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
79. 258 U.S. 451 (1922).
80. 258 U.S. at 456.
81. See, generally, A.B.A. Section of Antitrust Law, "Antitrust Developments- 1955-1968"
183 (1968).
82. Morton Salt v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 493 (1942).
83. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 140 (1969).
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or tends to create a monopoly. This is unnecessary to a showing of patent
misuse."
The patent misuse doctrine is grounded upon equitable principles. It applies
where patent infringement is involved. It has little application in situations
unrelated to any possibility of patent infringement. The action for patent
infringement is based upon the patent statutes," but, becaue it is of equit-
able origin, relief is denied if the patent owner has "unclean hands." To
allow relief where there has been patent misuse is contrary to the public in-
terest in confining the patentee to the boundaries of the patent monopoly."
A legal monopoly, granted as an exception to the general public policy
against monopolies, must be carefully circumscribed.
In the Motion Picture Patents and United Shoe Machinery cases, the
Supreme Court formulated the basic principles of the limitation of the pa-
tent grant. Founded upon these cases, the doctrine of patent misuse, or pat-
ent abuse as it was first called,"7 developed into an important defense in pat-
ent infringement cases involving tying. In Carbice Corporation of America
v. American Patent Development Corporation,'8 the patentee sought to en-
join contributory infringement by the defendant producer of dry ice that
was to be used in the plaintiff's patented ice cream transportation boxes (of
the type used by street vendors). The plaintiff sold dry ice with the express
condition that it be used only in the plaintiff's patented containers. Con-
versely, the patented containers were to be used only with the patented dry
ice of the plaintiff. Thus, only the dry ice customers of the plaintiff had li-
censes to use the patented containers. The licenses to use were implied when
the containers were purchased. No royalties were to be paid.
The Court held that tying the unpatented dry ice to the implied licenses to
use the containers constituted patent abuse and this was a complete defense
to a contributory infringement suit. The limited monopoly to make, use and
vend the invention could not be "expanded by limitations as to materials
and supplies necessary to the operation of it."" Although the Carbice case
suggested that relief for infringement was denied because of the attempt to
employ the patent to secure a limited monopoly of the unpatented
supplies,90 the rule was not so limited thereafter. In subsequent cases, tying
was held to be patent misuse even if no monopolization was attempted, as
84. Berlenbach v. Anderson & Thompson Ski Co., 329 F. 2d 782, 141 U.S.P.Q. 84 (9th Cir.
1964); Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Co. v. Tatnall, 268 F. 2d 395, 121 U.S.P.Q. 363 (3rd Cir.
1959).
85. 35 U.S.C. §§271-272 (1976 and Supp. 11 1979).
86. Morton Salt v. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488, 492-493 (1942).
87. Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 31 n. 1 (1931).
88. 283 U.S. 27 (1931).
89. 283 U.S. at 31.
90. 283 U.S. at 33-34.
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long as a significant amount of commerce in the tied product was affected
by the tying. Furthermore, the Carbice rule was applied to suits for direct
infringement as well as suits for contributory infringement. 9'
Having settled the question of tying an unpatented product to the use of a
patented device, the Supreme Court was next faced with attempted tying to
a patented process. It was thought that Carbice might be distinguished be-
cause there could be no implied license to use a patented process through the
sale of any raw material to be used in the process. This was not, to be the
result espoused by the Court. In Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Com-
pany, ". the Barber Company owned a process patent for retarding evapor-
ation during curing of concrete roads. The process utilized a commonly
used bituminous emulsion that the Barber Company sold in competition
with the defendant Leitch Manufacturing Company. Although Barber
granted no written licenses to practice the invention, road-builders were not
permitted to use the process unless the staple, unpatented emulsion was pur-
chased from Barber. Road-builders who bought the emulsion from anyone
else, such as Leitch, had no permission to use the process. This was similar
to the implied license in the Carbice case.
In Leitch Manufacturing, the Court held that the Carbice case was indistin-
guishable and the restriction prevented Barber from suing Leitch for con-
tributory infringement. The Court stated the rule broadly: "(E)very use of a
patent as a means of obtaining a limited monopoly of unpatented material
is prohibited." 93 Thus, whether the patent covered a device or a process, to
condition the use or sale of the invention upon the exclusive supply of
unpatented material from the patentee constituted a restriction which pre-
vented the patentee from recovering for infringement. The Second Circuit
extended the Leitch rule to the tying of a product specifically designed for
use in a patented process, even though it was not a staple article of com-
merce suitable for non-infringing use.9,
The leading case holding that a patent owner cannot condition a license
upon the purchase of unpatented supplies from the licensor is Morton Salt
Co. v. G.S. Suppiger."I The patentee licensed its patented salt tablet dis-
pensing machines with a requirement that only salt tablets sold by the paten-
tee could be used. In an action against an infringer, the Court denied relief
because of the misuse. It did not matter that the infringer did not compete
with the patentee in the sale of the tablets. The Court said:
91. American Lethicin Co. v. Warfield Co., 105 F. 2d 207, 42 U.S.P.Q. 180 (7th Cir.
1939).
92. 302 U.S. 458 (1938).
93. 302 U.S. at 463.
94. Philad Co. v. Lechler Labs, 107 F. 2d 747 (2nd Cir. 1939).
95. 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
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"It is the adverse effect upon the public interest of a successful infringe-
ment suit in conjunction with the patentee's course of conduct which
disqualifies him to maintain the suit, regardless of whether the par-
ticular defendant has suffered from the misuse of the patent.""
9
6
In a companion case to Morton Salt, the Court extended the misuse rule to
the owner of a method patent who authorized manufacturers to use it only
with materials supplied by the licensor.9
With the Morton Salt case, the Supreme Court had decided cases involving
unpatented materials and supplies tied to patented devices and to patented
processes. The next case considered a patent covering a combination of ele-
ments where the purchase of one of the elements was tied to a license to con-
struct the combination. In Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Investment
Co.,"9 the patented combination controlled coal-fired heating furnaces. It
comprised a room thermostat, a stoker limit switch and a thermostatic hot
air fan switch. None of the individual elements was patented. The owner of
the patent, in advertising its unpatented stoker switches, stated that the
right to use the patented system was granted only when its switches were
purchased from it and used in the system. The Court held that this consti-
tuted patent misuse, even though the stoker switch was the "heart of the in-
vention."' 9 The opinion was clear in its warning:
"fWhen the patentee ties something else to his invention, he acts only by
virtue of his right as the owner of the property to make contracts con-
cerning it and not otherwise. He then is subject to all the limitations
upon that right which the general law imposes upon such contracts. The
contract is not saved by anything in the patent laws because it relates to
the invention." 00
When implied licenses are granted only to buyers who purchase unpatented
elements for use in practicing the invention, some courts find it significant
that no licenses are ever offered to nonbuyers. ' Implied licenses are some-
times granted by "can label" licenses that authorize the purchaser of a non-
patented product to use it in practicing the patent. Some courts hold that, if
this is the only way a license can be obtained, this is tying and a misuse of
the patent."02
96. 314 U.S. at 444.
97. B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495 (1942).
98. 320 U.S. 661 (1944).
99. 320 U.S. at 667.
100. 320 U.S. at 666.
101. Lincoln Electric Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 171 F. 2d 223, 80 U.S.P.Q. 59 (6th Cir.
1948).
102, Rex Chainbelt, Inc. v. Harco Products, Inc., 512 F. 2d 993, 185 U.S.P.Q. 10 (9th Cir.
1975).
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The Supreme Court has recently resolved an important question left
unanswered after the Mercoid decision. In Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm
& Haas Co., 03 the owner of a method patent sold an unpatented nonstaple
chemical that constituted a material part of the patent. The right to practice
the patent was licensed only to buyers of the chemical who purchased from
the patentee. Competing sellers of the chemical were refused licenses, and,
when they persisted in selling the chemical, they were sued for contributory
infringement. The Court held that the patentee's conduct did not constitute
patent misuse because the chemical had no substantial noninfringing use.
Section 271(d) of the Patent Act"'0 therefore allowed the patentee to limit
the patent to its own customers. In the view of the Court:
"(B)y enacting §§271(c) and (d), Congress granted to patent holders a
statutory right to control nonstaple goods that are capable only of in-
fringing use in a patented invention, and that are essential to that in-
vention's advance over prior art."' 0 5
Four justices dissented. The dissenting opinions argued that this was a clas-
sic case of patent misuse because the patentee was extending the patent
monopoly to unpatented materials.' 0 In none of the opinions is there an
adequate discussion of the patentee's conduct as a tying device, although
the conduct clearly was such. The case is limited to tying an item that has no
use other than as a material part of a patented process, but the case does
open a tying door that had been closed.
To be patent misuse, it must appear that it is the use of the patent to which
the unpatented product is tied, and not to something else. Some business ar-
rangements involve trademarks and franchises, as well as patent licenses,
and the patent license may not be the tying culprit at all. 07 Also, in package
licensing it is possible that certain royalty arrangements appear to be tying
when they may be only convenient methods of measuring the intensity of
use of the patent license. '°0 Finally, if the buyer desiring an unpatented item
is required to take a patent license to obtain the patented item, this is not
misuse of the patent. 09
Once misuse is found, the patent is unenforceable until the consequences of
the misuse are purged. The patentee must show that it has fully abandoned
103. 448 U.S. 176 (1980).
104. 35 U.S.C. §271(d) (1976 and Supp. III 1979).
105. 448 U.S. at 213.
106. 448 U.S. at 230, 240.
107. See Kolene Corp. v. Motor City Metal Treating, Inc., 440 F. 2d 77 (6th Cir. 1971).
108. See, e.g., Clayton Manufacturing Co. v. Cline, 427 F. Supp. 78, 203 U.S.P.Q. 398 (C.D.
Cal. 1976). (Expired patents were not tying items.)
109. St. Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co., Inc., 403 F. Supp. 776, 188 U.S.P.Q. 107 (S.D. Ill.
1975).
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its illegal practices and that the consequences of that practice have been ful-
ly dissipated. ",0 These issues are questions of fact, '" and the determination
of whether there has been an effective purge is within the discretion of the
trial court." 2
III. Conclusion
Tying clauses seldom escape the ambit of the antitrust laws when the tying
item is patented, whether the tying is through a patent license or a lease.
This is true whether the right to make, to use or to sell the patented in-
vention is licensed, or whether any combination of the three rights is li-
censed.
There are many excellent business reasons for using tying clauses in licenses
or leases. They are of no avail to the litigant because most tying is per se il-
legal under the antitrust laws, and it constitutes patent misuse besides.
When the tied product is functionally related to the tying product, the li-
censor's total market position is strengthened by increasing his share of the
market for the tied product. It is an unjustifiable extension of the patent
monopoly to use it for leverage in the market for the tied product. While a
patentee should be permitted to enforce license provisions that insure a fair
return on the patented invention, that return must be gained in the market
for the invention, and not in another product market.
Numerous tying arrangements and many kinds of tied items have been in-
volved in patent tying cases. Services are sometimes tied to licenses or
leases, particularly maintenance services. Tying is illegal under Section 1 of
the Sherman Act, but not all such arrangements are classified as per se
violations. Furthermore, they do not survive attack under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act if monopoly power is a goal of the patentee. Section 3 of the
Clayton has also been an important tool in attacking tying arrangements.
It is clearly the monopoly power of the patent grant that is the primary fac-
tor in finding most tying provisions to be illegal. While not all issued patents
have the same degree of monopoly power and, in fact, some patents are
quite narrow in scope, the courts have not generally distinguished between
patents on the basis of the strength of the patent claims. The law of tying re-
quires that the tying item have sufficient market power in order for a tying
violation to be found, and the elasticity of the demand for the patented item
should be considered. Products sold by competitors of the patentee, if
110. B.B. Chemical Co. v. Ellis, 314 U.S. 495, 498 (1942).
III.U.S. Gypsum Co. v. National Gypsum Co., 352 U.S. 457, 465 (1957).
112.. U.S. v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 89 (1951); International Salt Co. v. U.S., 332
U.S. 392, 400-401 (1947).
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properly includible in the relevant market, should be duly considered in
measuring the market power of the patented item. It would seem that a finer
analysis is needed than that now afforded by the courts.
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